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SERVICE PROVISION ON A NETWORK  
WITH ENDOGENOUS CONSUMPTION CAPACITY 
 







We present a model in which the consumers’ capacity to access a service 
provided on a network depends negatively on the price charged by the network owner 
per capacity unit. Several scenarios concerning the structure of the downstream service 
provision market are studied. First, a monopolist operates in both the network and the 
service provision stage. Second, we assume duopolistic competition between the network 
owner and the entrant. Third, we allow for endogenous differentiation of the services 
provided by the two competitors. Generally speaking, the duopolistic structure does not 
necessarily enhance consumer surplus. Furthermore, competition in the service 
provision market may reduce social welfare, either due to excessive differentiation or 
due to a low network density. 
 
Keywords:  telecommunications markets, regulation, endogenous consumption 
capacity 
JEL classification: D43, L13, L51 
 
 
  21 Introduction
The main reasons to regulate telecommunications relate to the special characteristics of the supply
and demand structures and the overall market organization. The telecommunications sector is capital
intensive, characterized by large sunk investments necessary to set up a network. Historically, service
production in the telecommunications sector has been undertaken by a network operator, who has been
also acting as a monopolist in the service provision market. In this case, the role of regulation has
been to ensure that the monopolist behaves in accordance with the public interest, avoiding possible
abuses of monopoly power. The main economic argument for this kind of intervention was that a
single operator would be able to provide services at lower rates and with a wider coverage than a
market served by a number of smaller scale competitive operators. In fact, a single operator is in
a better position to dimension and plan the construction of a network (technical e¢ ciency) and to
avoid unnecessary investments and excess capacity. Thereby economies of scale can better ensure
compatibility of all parts of the network, and technical and administrative cost related to network
integration and interconnection can be minimized.
However, this institutional set up has proved to be rather ine¢ cient in accommodating the sharp
demand increases within a wave of liberalization and privatization processes. On one hand, monopolists
have been unable to cover customer demand in a satisfactory way. As a consequence, it has been very
di¢ cult both to control tari⁄s and to ensure high productivity. On the other hand, the pressure to allow
new operators into the market has increased, mostly in the presence of rapid technological advances and
development of new products as broadband internet access. Depending on the measures adopted, three
general types of market may emerge. First, in order to encourage e¢ ciency, a number of countries have
opted for unbundling network property and service provision. Second, some countries have liberalized
the service provision market maintaining the monopoly in the ownership of the network. Finally, in
many cases, the network monopolist is allowed to compete at the service provision market.
However, in order to assess the desirability of a given market structure, the social gains from
increased competition must be compared to possible e¢ ciency losses associated with service provision
by many smaller-scale providers. Indeed, the comparison between the advantages and disadvantages of
competition is not a trivial task, although there seems to be a general consensus in favor of competition.
Free and open competition bene￿ts individual consumers by ensuring lower prices, new and better
products and services than occurs under monopoly conditions. In a competitive market ￿rms compete
for customers by lowering prices and increasing the wealth of the society. A policy framework to
establish, foster, and regulate competition is critical to the delivery of bene￿ts expected and demanded
by consumers. Then, in order to achieve the bene￿ts of competition described above, governments and
2regulators must establish an appropriate policy framework to govern the telecommunications sector.
Once it becomes clear that a more competitive environment should be pursued, the problem arises
that in a sector like the one described above achieving perfect competition is di¢ cult if not impossible,
because in most areas there is typically only one supplier. Therefore, when perfect competition is far
from feasible and the market forces cannot automatically lead to the ￿rst best solution through free
entry, the regulator is faced with the question of which kind of competitive structure would be the
most reliable in each speci￿c case. Most often, the point of departure in national telecommunication
markets is one incumbent operator which provides the network jointly with the service. It is possible
that other network suppliers will arrive at the market as long as tari⁄s are high enough to allow
them recover their entry costs. In the related literature, this case is referred to as two-way access or
interconnection model. However, it may be very di¢ cult for new suppliers to enter into the market
due to institutional or technical barriers to entry. The latter may include economies of scale and
economies of scope. Furthermore, economies of vertical integration beyond the network are usually
large in telecommunication markets. An example of this can be found in one-way access cases.1
In many such industries, a consumer￿ s connection to the network depends, at least partially on the
network owner￿ s decision concerning the density network available, which in its turn determines the
customer￿ s capacity to consume the services available. In some other cases, consumers decide their
own consumption capacities. For instance, electricity networks are accessed by households through
nodes providing access to local grids. The capacity installed is determined by the magnitude of the
investment undertaken by the consumer. Thereafter, the consumer￿ s demand of the services provided
through the electric network critically depends on his private investment decision. At the same time,
this decision depends on the cost borne by the consumer per unit-capacity installed, which is determined
by an access price charged by the network owner per capacity unit. Alternatively, the network owner
may decides the capacity available at each price, which is usually the case with telecommunications
markets when broadband internet access is o⁄ered to the user through a DSL (Digital Subscriber Line)
technology. Depending on the cost of di⁄erent connection alternatives, users may install a superior
Internet connection enhancing the speed with which they can access Internet services (perform searches,
download pages, exchange ￿les, etc.), thus determining their potential demand of these services within
the time they can spend online. To highlight the importance of the issues studied in the present
paper, we mention a recent case of regulation, in which the Spanish Commission for the Market
of Telecommunications (CMT) reduced the price paid by new broadband service providers to the
incumbent of the network, Telefonica. The measure was adopted as a means of promoting competition
1For a detailed revision of one- and two-way access and the pricing rules used in telecommunications markets see
Vogelsang 2003.
3in the provision of broadband Internet services by guaranteeing fair entry conditions to new entrants
wishing to use Telefonica￿ s loop for Internet allowing a provider￿ s broadband services to reach the user.
In the telecommunications case described above, the resulting pricing scheme is slightly di⁄erent
from standard two-part tari⁄s, in that, prior to competition in the ￿nal service market, the ￿xed access
fee or lease price paid to gain access to the grid determines the potential density of demand or, in
other words, the market size. This is a central feature of our analysis. A further element we want
to capture is the fact that, usually, the capacity provision market is less competitive than the service
provision one. As we mentioned above, this may be due to a number of reasons, among which the
most important are the institutional history of many strategic markets (energy, telecommunications,
etc.) and the size of sunk costs necessary to setup the network infrastructure.
The literature on markets served by a network has paid special attention to the suppliers￿ability of
applying nonlinear pricing schemes. Regarding two-way access it is interesting that such schemes are
based on two-part tari⁄s consisting of a ￿xed component granting access to the network and a variable
one, linearly depending on the units of service consumed. Recently, the issues of partial consumer
participation in a network and the e⁄ects of interconnection pricing have separately attracted some
economists￿attention. Speci￿cally, with respect to the ￿rst of these issues, Dessein (2003) and Schi⁄
(2002) develop models with partial consumer participation. However, in their framework consumer
participation depends on whether the consumer￿ s reservation price exceeds the generalized price, de-
￿ned as the sum of the ￿xed access price and the variable expenditure due to consumption of the ￿nal
service. This modeling strategy is analogous to that adopted by Peitz (2005a and 2005b) in a spatial
model with elastic demand in that both methods yield endogenously determined demands following the
generalized prices and, thus, market competition. In fact, Peitz also deals with the issue of intercon-
nection, suggesting an asymmetric regulation of access pricing. However, in those papers, a two-part
tari⁄is used by ￿rms possessing independent networks. The regulator establishes an asymmetric access
price policy such that the entrant pays a lower access to the incumbent for the use of the network. This
has two positive e⁄ects on competition: the entrant is more likely to enter and, if this occurs, com-
petition is enhanced. This measure protects consumers but decreases total surplus because it distorts
the per-minute price of the incumbent. In an earlier paper by Armstrong (1998), a ￿xed retail price
was assumed to be charged by an incumbent serving a population of consumers with a unit demand
for the service. A higher access price leads the entrant to set lower retail prices. Behringer (2004)
studies a duopoly model in which there are two interconnected networks across which access prices are
determined non-reciprocally by each network￿ s owners. Like in many of the aforementioned papers,
demand is elastic. In these frameworks, entry into the telecommunications industry will increase total
welfare compared with the initial monopoly situation, depending on the utility gains from connection
4and from outgoing calls. Contrary to these approaches, we deal with the case of one-way access. In
our framework there is a unique network owned by the incumbent, on which the demand potential
is determined by the cost borne by consumers at the capacity installation stage, preceding both the
entry of the network owner￿ s competitor and posterior price competition. In a somehow related but
di⁄erently focused paper by Aguilar and Herguera (2004) a model is proposed to study the e⁄ects
of interconnection between telecommunication networks whose capacity is ￿xed by the regulator. It
is shown that a capacity-based regime induces more aggressive pricing in the ￿nal service, increasing
welfare. De Bijl and Peitz (2002, 2005, 2006) analyze local loop unbundling in which the entrant needs
to connect to the network and it has market power. They stress that access regulation is appropri-
ate in early stages of competition, when entrants have not yet developed alternative infrastructures.
However, they found that unbundling requirements are neutral to competition.
We set up a model of spatial competition in the provision of the ￿nal service. Consumer hetero-
geneity captures the consumers￿di⁄ering degrees of speci￿city to one of the services available in the
market. Suppliers￿locations represent the choice of service characteristics. In a stage preceding the
usual location and pricing stages, the network owner determines the consumer￿ s consumption capacity,
represented by consumer density along the service characteristics space. Finally, the entrant￿ s connec-
tion cost is determined by either the network owner or a regulator. Under this environment, we study
i) the relation between service competition and network access pricing with endogenous consumption
capacity, ii) the e¢ ciency of the resulting market depending on the overall capacities and market split
among the providers of the ￿nal service and iii) the degree of di⁄erentiation between service providers
in comparison to the socially optimal one.
The rest of paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the set up of the model and the
benchmark case. Section 3 develops and solves the model under di⁄erent scenarios concerning the
industry con￿guration. Section 4 discusses the welfare implications of our framework. Section 5
presents the main conclusions and policy implications. All proofs are included in an appendix at the
end of the paper.
2 The theoretical benchmark
A ￿rm labelled M is the owner of the network infrastructure which is necessary in order to provide a
service to a ￿xed population of users (broadband internet access, for instance). Consumer heterogeneity
is represented in the way adopted by the spatial model of Hotelling (1929) and its extensions introduced
by D￿ Aspremont et al. (1979), where consumers￿ideal varieties are uniformly distributed along the
unit interval with a constant density, D. Let D also represent the market potential resulting from
5a consumer￿ s consumption capacity decision. This depends on the quality of the network access. In
the case of broadband internet access its means the capacity of the connection. Let the consumer￿ s
installed consumption capacity D inversely depend on a price p charged by the network owner, as
implied by D = 1 ￿ p. The intuition behind this is that, for a given exogenous capacity installed,
the network owner decides the density o⁄ered depending on the consumers￿demand for capacity. The
capacity available to the users is o⁄ered at a constant unit cost, k 2 [0;1).
2.1 Monopoly
As a benchmark case, we ￿rst consider that M is the monopolist in the provision of the service to
consumers, incurring a constant marginal cost cM. In all the scenarios considered hereafter, we assume
that service suppliers are obliged to provide universal service, although this in our framework does not
imply a constant market size, which is ultimately determined by consumption capacity decisions.
After having charged a price p for the consumption capacity installed, M sets a retail price rM per
unit of service consumed. Although this pricing pattern is very similar to a standard two-part tari⁄,
it corresponds to a two-stage decision, of which the ￿rst part determines the market potential and the
second extracts surplus from a ￿xed population of consumers.
Given rM, p and the resulting network density D, each consumer is assumed to have a unit demand
for the service which yields her a utility of U = maxfR ￿ p ￿ rM ￿ t ￿ (lM ￿ x)2;0g, where R is a
reservation price for the service, lM is the monopolist￿ s variety on the line of real numbers representing
the product characteristics space, x is the user￿ s ideal variety on the interval [0;1] and t￿(lM ￿x)2 is a
term capturing the quadratic utility loss experienced by the user due to the distance between his ideal
variety and that actually provided to her by M. Notice that the utility enjoyed from the consumption
of a unit service depends indirectly on the capacity installed as a function of p. Moreover, the capacity
installed determines the density of services used per consumer.
Using the complete market coverage restriction, the monopolist￿ s pro￿t is given by:








Then, it is straightforward to show the following result:
Proposition 1 (Monopoly outcome): A network monopolist M operating under the restriction
of global service provision locates in the middle of the segment (b lM = 1=2), charging an access price
of b pM = 0 yielding maximal density b D = 1 and a retail price for the provision of the service equal to
b rM = R ￿ t=4.
6Proposition 1 implies that a monopolist extracts the maximum possible surplus, after having in-
duced maximal consumption density (setting the capacity access price equal to zero) and a minimal
distance from the consumers located on the extremes of the [0;1] interval.
Substituting the equilibrium magnitudes presented in Proposition 1 into the monopolist￿ s pro￿t
function we get:




Therefore, as expected, the monopolist￿ s equilibrium pro￿ts positively depend on the consumer￿ s max-
imal willingness to pay for the service, and negatively on the unit costs of service and capacity access
provision, as well as the heterogeneity coe¢ cient t. Intuitively, the two cost parameters k and cM have
a greater impact on the monopolist￿ s maximal pro￿t than the heterogeneity of consumers measured
by t, because all demand is automatically captured by M.
The solution coincides with the implementation of the socially optimal monopoly location and
access capacity pricing scheme, as it maximizes the market potential. However, this should not be
taken to imply that this is the best solution for the consumer, given that the transfer of rM from
the consumer to the network monopolist is not taken into account. It is a trivial consequence of
our framework, that in￿nite pricing schemes exist involving di⁄erent levels of consumer surplus, all
of which would lead to the same level of aggregate welfare. In fact, there is a trade-o⁄ between the
monopolist￿ s pro￿tability from the access capacity market and consumer surplus. More speci￿cally,
when rM = cM +k the monopolist￿ s pro￿t is minimized with ￿M = 0 and maximal consumer surplus.
This implies the aforementioned continuum of regulation schemes yielding maximal total social welfare,
depending on the regulator￿ s decision on the implemented rM 2 [cM + k;R ￿ t=4].
3 Duopoly in service provision
We now extend the notation introduced so far to setup a model in which a new entrant, E, competes
in prices with M in the provision of the service, faced with a unit cost cE. Apart from variable
costs related to the provision of the service, the entrant has to pay the network owner a connection
fee ￿ 2 [0;1] per unit of service. In this sense, our framework is one of one-way access where the
entrant needs to connect to the network in order to supply the service. Depending on the scenario
considered, this fee may be set by the regulator or the network owner. Therefore, apart from the usual
business-stealing e⁄ect, the entrant￿ s market share has also a positive e⁄ect on the network owner￿ s
pro￿ts, as the latter earns ￿ per service unit provided by E. From the de￿nition of ￿, we do not rule
out the possibility of ￿ ￿ k. Thus, the cost k borne by M may not be fully covered by the entrant￿ s
connection fee or may be just equal to it. Although this would not be what one would expect from
7the monopolist￿ s decision on ￿, it could correspond to the regulator￿ s decision to subsidize the entrant
or partially compensate M for the costs incurred to maintain the network infrastructure. Finally,
depending on the case considered, we allow E and M to simultaneously chose locations on the line of
real numbers representing the product characteristics space. In order to isolate the e⁄ects of entry fee
and location choices on the resulting subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE), we consider 4 cases:
￿ Case 1: Exogenous connection fee and ￿rm locations,
￿ Case 2: Exogenous connection fee and endogenous ￿rm locations,
￿ Case 3: Endogenous connection fee and exogenous ￿rm locations,
￿ Case 4: Endogenous connection fee and ￿rm locations.
In the ￿rm location stage, M is always the ￿rm on the left and E is the ￿rm on the right. In the
case of exogenous ￿rm locations, we assume that the two ￿rms provide services which correspond to
the extremes of the segment [0;1] along which consumers￿ideal varieties are distributed. When the
entrant￿ s connection fee is exogenously given by the regulator authorities, we consider ￿ as a model
parameter. Superscripts 1-4 denote equilibrium magnitudes corresponding to each one of the four
cases.
3.1 Case 1: Exogenous connection fee and ￿rm locations
The two ￿rms compete in prices taking each other￿ s location on the extreme of the [0;1] interval as
given. The entrant￿ s connection fee ￿ paid to M is also exogenously given. Thus, the resulting game
consists of two stages. First, M sets p, which determines the density D or market potential on the
network; second, ￿rms simultaneously set retail prices, rM and rE.









yielding service demands dM = (1 ￿ p)e x and dE = (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ e x) for the incumbent and the entrant,
respectively. Then, the two ￿rms￿pro￿ts are given by:
￿M = (p ￿ k)dM + (p + a ￿ k)dE + (rM ￿ cM)dM; (2)
and
￿E = (rE ￿ cE ￿ a)dE; (3)
respectively.
8We solve the game by backward induction. We obtain the equilibrium in the pricing stage ￿rst,
and substitute the solution into M￿ s pro￿t function to determine the network capacity. The resulting
equilibrium yields:
Proposition 2 (Duopoly with exogenous connection fee and ￿rm locations): When the
service is provided by a duopoly consisting of the network owner M and an entrant E who is asked to
pay an entry cost of ￿ to the former, with both M and E located on the extremes of the unit interval





36t is charged to the consumers. Then,
Nash equilibrium retail prices are given by r1
M = ￿+t+ 1
3(2cM +cE) and r1
E = ￿+t+ 1
3(2cE +cM).
It is interesting to note that the solution described in Proposition 2 accounts for the fact that the
network owner￿ s pro￿t is a⁄ected less than in the usual spatial competition model by rival￿ s sales, given
that the latter pays the former a connection fee of ￿ per unit of service provided to the entrant￿ s clients
through the network. The equilibrium in retail prices is symmetric and the e⁄ect of the per service
unit transfer from E to M has a positive, direct impact on retail prices of both service suppliers.
As a consequence, second stage equilibrium pro￿ts are given by:
￿M(p) =





(1 ￿ p)(cM ￿ cE + 3t)2
18t
;
which indicate an interesting property of the framework. Namely, only M￿ s equilibrium pro￿ts are
(positively) a⁄ected by ￿. This can also be seen on equilibrium retail prices which fully re￿ ect increases
in ￿. However, for the entrant, this increase in retail prices has no direct e⁄ect on equilibrium pro￿ts,
because it equals the amount the entrant spends per service unit to use the network infrastructure.
By the ￿xed locations assumption adopted in this case, total transportation costs are equal to those
of the monopoly case above. However, a source of ine¢ ciency identi￿ed here relates to the network
owner￿ s reduced incentives to encourage installation of maximal consumption capacity, because the
entrant will now enjoy part of the bene￿ts from a more dense network.
Substituting the equilibrium price p1
M into expressions (2) and (3) yielding a network density D < 1,
































is always positive for all parameter values, contrary to the property obtained by De Bijl and Peitz
(2006) in a symmilar setting. The existence of a network density D promotes that E￿ s pro￿ts are not
neutral to the access fee ￿ The intuition behind this result is that the higher the participation of M
in E￿ s revenues, the less are the former￿ s incentives to undercut prices in order to steal business from
the latter.
3.2 Case 2: Exogenous connection fee and endogenous ￿rm locations
In this case, the game includes a ￿rm location stage between the stages in which p and retail prices
are determined.










We denote by lM and lE ￿rms￿location choices on the line of real numbers (￿1;+1). Thus,
locations outside the [0;1] interval may also be chosen. Solution of the game by backward induction
leads us to the following result:
Proposition 3 (Duopoly with endogenous di⁄erentiation and exogenous network entry
costs): When the service is provided by a duopoly consisting of the network owner M and an entrant E
who is asked to pay an exogenously determined entry fee ￿ to the former, with both M and E choosing













4) and the margins for the provision of a service unit by each retailer are given by r2




E = ￿ + 3t
2 + 2cM￿cE
3 .
The most interesting property that is implied in the equilibrium described in Proposition 3 is that
both duopolists will locate outside the interval [0;1], as long as their unit costs of providing the service
are not too di⁄erent from each other in which case one of them might locate inside the segment. In all
cases, however, the two ￿rms￿locations will not simultaneously deviate from (￿1=4;5=4) towards the
center of the unit interval, which would be the necessary condition for a more e¢ cient location than
10that of the monopolist. Therefore, we ￿nd that market competition always yields excessive product
di⁄erentiation as compared both to the socially optimal and that of the monopolist in the absence
of independent entry. Finally, a further ine¢ ciency arising in the case studied here has already been
identi￿ed in the previous case. That is, the network owner sets an access capacity price above zero,
achieving less than maximal market potential.


















It can be checked that, like in Case 1, the entrant￿ s pro￿t positively depends on the incumbent￿ s


























which implies that the larger degree of di⁄erentiation between ￿rms in Case 2 decreases the intensity of
strategic interaction, thus, leading to a more moderate e⁄ect of the incumbent￿ s pro￿t on those of the
entrant. However, it can be checked that the aforementioned di⁄erence in the e⁄ects of the entrant￿ s
pro￿ts on those of the incumbent decreases as the di⁄erence cM ￿ cE increases.
3.3 Case 3: Endogenous connection fee and exogenous ￿rm locations
In this case, we assume that the network owner decides on the connection fee ￿ that the entrant is
charged per service unit provided to its clients.2 The decision is made as the same stage at which p
is ￿xed, previous to the retail price competition. Thus, we recover the exogenous location assumption
but relax the assumption of network connection fee exogeneity. Pro￿t functions and the remaining
notation introduced above are valid here. Solution of the game using backward induction leads us to
the following result:
2Suppose, for instance, that regulator authorities de￿ne the market functioning rules with no further intervention in
the market.
11Proposition 4 (Duopoly with endogenous connection fee and exogenous di⁄erentia-
tion): When the service is provided by a duopoly consisting of the network owner M and an en-
trant E who is asked to pay a connexion fee ￿ to the former, with both M and E located on the
extremes of the unit interval [0;1], M sets p3 = 0, yielding maximal density D = 1 and charges





18t . Then, the Nash equilibrium margins for
the provision of a service unit by each retailer are given by r3













From the result reported in Proposition 4, e¢ ciency losses due to less than maximal network
capacity induced by a positive p disappear. At the same time, the exogenous imposition of locations
on the extremes of the unit interval makes this con￿guration equally e¢ cient to the monopoly case
as far as total transportation costs are concerned. Therefore, this case and the monopoly structure
are equally e¢ cient, although it should be noted that the duopoly case studied here improves social
welfare through competition yielding lower retail prices.











(cM ￿ cE + 3t)
2
18t2 : (5)
3.4 Case 4: Endogenous connection fee and ￿rm locations
In this case, the two games described above are combined. Firm locations are chosen in a stage following
the choice of ￿ and preceding the price competition stage. Notation and expressions introduced above
are also valid here. Solution of the game by backward induction yields the following results:
Proposition 5 (Duopoly with endogenous di⁄erentiation and network entry costs):
When a service is provided by a duopoly consisting of the network owner M and an entrant E who
is asked to pay an entry cost of a to the former, with both M and E choosing their locations on
the interval (￿1;+1), M sets p4 = 0, yielding maximal density D = 1 and charges E an entry












4) and the margins for the provision of a service unit by each retailer are given
by r4












Although maximal network density is achieved in this con￿guration, locations are ine¢ ciently
chosen, leading to excessive product di⁄erentiation.
12Substituting the equilibrium magnitudes presented in Proposition 5 into the two ￿rms￿pro￿t func-
tions, yields:
￿4
M = 1; (6)
￿4
E =




With respect to the incumbent￿ s equilibrium pro￿t, it must be noted that if we express pro￿ts as
a function of costs and connection fee, we get:
￿4















which helps us understand the intuition behind the way ￿4 is determined. If, for example, cE = cM the
monopolist sets the connection fee equal to 1+k from which the cost of heterogeneity, 3t
4 , is subtracted.
If cE > cM it can be seen that ￿ is a decreasing function of the cost di⁄erence. Intuitively, this can
be understood as a strategy aimed at facilitating the entrant￿ s connection and bene￿tting, through
￿, from a larger number of service units. In other words, the incumbent extracts all possible surplus
from the capacity-installing stage, leaving the entrant with some of the bene￿ts from exploitation of
consumer heterogeneity through product di⁄erentiation. It is also important to observe, that as ￿rms
are here free to locate, thus mitigating the ￿erceness of competition, the resulting retail prices are
lower than in the exogenous locations case.
In the following subsection, we discuss the implications of our results for social welfare and economic
policy, combining the results presented so far.
4 Social welfare considerations
In this framework, social welfare analysis becomes both relatively straightforward and insightful.
Let us recall that the case of monopoly under the assumption of full market coverage case achieves
the maximum level of social welfare that can be reached by a single provider of the service. This is
given by:
SWM = R ￿ k ￿ cM ￿ 2
Z 1=2
0




We use this case as a benchmark to assess the e⁄ects of liberalization on overall market e¢ ciency.
Using the fact that equilibrium locations will in general be outside the unit interval, in the following
speci￿cation of social welfare, we consider location pairs for which the incumbent￿ s location lies weakly
13below 0 and the entrant￿ s location is weakly higher than 1. Then, social welfare in the duopoly case is
given by:







By observation of the above expressions of social welfare, given a speci￿c market structure, there
are three sources of possible ine¢ ciencies: ￿rst, deviations from the maximal network density D = 1
resulting from access capacity prices, p > 0; second, higher than minimal transport costs due to location
choices di⁄erent from the pair (l￿
M;l￿
E) = (1=4;3=4) in the duopoly case, or lM = 1=2 in the presence
of a single service provider; third, ine¢ cient splits of the market between the two suppliers. Regarding
this last source of ine¢ ciency, consider the case of equal service provision costs, cE = cM. Then, if
￿rms are symmetrically located with respect to the consumers￿unit length segment the e¢ cient market
split is one in which consumers are equally shared between the two suppliers. The optimal location of
the indi⁄erent consumer is x￿ = 1=2. With cM 6= cE, the desirable condition is that the more e¢ cient
supplier serves more consumers than the ine¢ cient one up to the point at which the extra traveling
paid by clients served along a broader market segment, do not exceed the e¢ ciency gains from being
supplied by the e¢ cient provider. Comparison between Duopoly cases 1, 2 on one hand and cases
3 and 4 on the other hand shows that the existence of a connection fee paid by the entrant to the
incumbent induces asymmetric splits when there are costs asymmetries between suppliers in the service
market. In this framework, this is the major justi￿cation for regulating the conditions o⁄ered to the
entrant in the network connection stage. The interpretation of the remaining sources of ine¢ ciencies
is straightforward, but the ￿rst of them is not standard in the literature. Thus, several points raised
on the e¢ ciency of the structures discussed here are novel and, thus, di¢ cult to compare with other
similar results in the literature.
The ￿rst observation concerning social welfare refers to the monopoly case. Although we have
assumed that the monopolist has the obligation to o⁄er universal service, a non-trivial result states
that, under the monopoly scenario, the capacity installed by the consumers will maximize the density
of the network, implementing the socially optimal solution. Regarding the service characteristics, the
monopolist chooses the central location, which is also the socially optimal solution conditional on the
existence of a single provider. As we will see, this location could be improved by a duopolistic service
market, as long as ￿rms choose locations which lie su¢ ciently close to (1=4;3=4). With respect to
this last point, our results indicate that the choice of locations by duopolists in Cases 2 and 4 will in
general be more ine¢ cient than the monopolist￿ s location in the middle of the consumers￿segment.
This is straightforward to show if we have in mind that locating two providers on the extremes of the
segment [0;1] leads to the same total transportation costs as the location of a single provider in the
14middle of the segment.
Therefore, our results can be seen as a source of pessimism concerning the ability of competition to
increase social welfare in markets providing services on a network. On the contrary, the existence of a
competitor puts downward pressure on retail prices, although the transfer of revenue from the entrant
to the network owner diminishes the latter￿ s incentives to undercut retail prices. Furthermore, this
e⁄ect persists, although at di⁄erent levels, no matter who decides on the connection fee. This justi￿es
and supports the alternative measure often adopted by regulators in many countries, in which a ￿xed
transfer is paid to the network owner by the entrant, leaving una⁄ected the incentives of competitors
to engage in pro-competitive retail price undercutting.
The general conclusion drawn from our analysis is that competition may increase the consumer￿ s
surplus, but does not necessarily enhance social welfare. Monopoly is as e¢ cient as Duopoly under
Case 3, in which di⁄erentiation is not allowed beyond the support of consumer preferences. In all other
cases, excessive product di⁄erentiation is obtained. Cases 1and 2 lead to further e¢ ciency losses due
to the incentives provided to the network owner to restrict output in the capacity provision stage.
5 Conclusions and policy implications
Our analysis has focused on the fact that a network which is used to provide a service may be accessed
by consumers whose connection capacity determines their potential consumption and thus the market
size. Although setting the price of access capacity and of the service consumed is very similar to a
standard two-part tari⁄, it corresponds to a two-stage decision, of which the ￿rst part determines the
market potential and the second extracts consumer surplus.
Apart from this element, our analysis includes other more standard features. First, the network
owner participates in the service provision market. At the same time, new entrants are charged a
connection fee per service unit they provide to their clients. Finally, the network monopolist and the
entrant are assumed to compete in retail prices in the provision of the ￿nal service.
Although the literature and regulators have paid some attention to the e⁄ects of connection fees and
transfers paid by the entrant to the incumbent, our results call for a more cautious attitude towards
this issue. Of course, it is important to note that our recommendation for a more permissive attitude
towards connection fees charged by the incumbent does not refer to the case in which such fees prevent
new ￿rms from entering into the market, as our framework assumes that the structure of the sector
is exogenously given. However, once this possibility is ruled out, the entrants￿payments in the form
of transfers to the incumbent are found to be neutral with respect to the social welfare resulting from
each structure, having a negative impact on consumer surplus alone. Therefore, the decision of the
15Spanish CMT to regulate Telefonica￿ s network usage prices paid by its rivals can be justi￿ed as a
measure favoring consumers, rather than overall market e¢ ciency.
Generally speaking, our ￿ndings yield far more concerns about market ine¢ ciencies arising from
excessive di⁄erentiation of services aimed at relaxing price competition rather than satisfying con-
sumers￿needs. The importance of product di⁄erentiation strategies in markets for services provided
on a network is a well documented fact3, but the possibility of e¢ ciency losses due to excessive dif-
ferentiation in the endogenous capacity network is a completely novel element of our analysis. Along
this line, the main contribution of this paper to the literature on network-based provision of services is
that when competition is introduced in the provision of a service, the network monopolist￿ s incentives
to encourage ￿nal users to install maximal consumption capacity are reduced, leading to a lower than
maximal market potential.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The monopolist￿ s pro￿t function is ￿M(p;rM) = (1 ￿ p)(p ￿ k) + (1 ￿ p)(rM ￿ cM). Behavior
at the third stage is de￿ned by the condition:
@￿M(p;rM)
@rM
= 1 ￿ p > 0:
This partial derivative with respect to the monopolist￿ s strategy rM is always positive for all p 2 [0;1).
However, following our assumptions, the monopolist cannot ￿x rM larger than that guaranteeing
full coverage of the market. In fact this restriction determines the monopolist￿ s location. First, the
monopolist has no incentive to locate outside the unit interval because consumers are located inside it.
Then, lM 2 [0;1]. Provided that the utility for all consumers must be larger or equal to zero, solving
for x we get the two roots:
x1 = lM ￿
p
R￿p￿rM p




Using these expressions and the fact that the net utility for the consumers located at x = 0, and x = 1
will be equal to zero due to the monopolists￿market power, we get
b x = 0;) lM =
p
R￿p￿rM p




Then, given that lM is unique along [0;1], it is straightforward that rM(p) = R ￿ p ￿ t
4. Now, at the
second stage the decision about location is trivial. With rM(p) substituted in (8), we get that l￿
M = 1=2
3See the recent study by Greenstein and Mazzeo (2006) on the case of telecommunication markets.
16. Finally, at the ￿rst stage the monopoly pro￿t function is ￿M(p) = (1￿p)(p￿k)+(1￿p)(R￿p￿ t
4￿cM),








The sign of @￿M
@p determines the value of p and rM. The monopoly pro￿t function can be expressed
in a simple way as ￿M(p) = (1 ￿ p)(R ￿ k ￿ t
4 ￿ cM). These two parts of the pro￿t function must
be positive to get non-zero pro￿ts. Then, (R ￿ k ￿ t
4 ￿ cM) > 0, or ￿R + (k + t
4 + cM) < 0; that is,
@￿M
@p < 0. As a consequence, the best access price for the monopolist is b pM = 0, and b rM(0) = R ￿ t
4.
This completes the proof.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. At the retail stage both ￿rms, M and E set retail prices which in equilibrium satisfy:
@￿M(rM;rE;p)




@rE = (1 ￿ p)
(a+cE+rM￿2rE+t)
2t = 0;
whose simultaneous solution yields r1
M = ￿+t+ 1
3(2cM+cE) and r1




E into the pro￿t functions of the incumbent and the entrant we obtain second stage pro￿ts,









Finally, the network monopolist decides p in order to satisfy:
@￿M(p)






36t . This completes the proof.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. At the 3rd stage ￿rms set retail prices which in equilibrium satisfy:
@￿M(p;lM;lE;rM;rE)














whose simultaneous solution yields retail third stage prices rM(lM;lE) = ￿+
2cM+cE+t(lE￿lM)(2+lE+lM)
3 ,
and rE(lM;lE) = ￿ +
2cE+cM￿t(lE￿lM)(lE+lM￿4)
3 . Substituting rM (lM;lE) and rE(lM;lE) into the














At the second stage, ￿rms decide locations lM;lE which in equilibrium satisfy the ￿rst order con-
ditions:
@￿M(p;lM;lE)




@lE = (1 ￿ p)
[(cM￿cE)+(lE￿lM)(3lE￿lM￿4)t][(cM￿cE)￿(lE￿lM)(lE+lM￿4)t]
18t(lE￿lM)2 = 0:








Substituting rM (lM;lE) and rE(lM;lE) into the pro￿t functions of the monopolist and the entrant
￿rm respectively, we obtain second stage equilibrium pro￿ts,












Finally, at the ￿rst stage, the network owner M sets p to satisfy the ￿rst order condition,
@￿M(p)
@p






27t . This completes the proof.
6.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. At the retail stage M and E set retail prices which in equilibrium satisfy the ￿rst order
conditions:
@￿M(rM;rE;p)




@rE = (1 ￿ p)
(￿+cE+rM￿2rE+t)
2t = 0;
whose simultaneous solution yields retail prices r3











18t . Substituting r3
M and r3
E into the pro￿ts functions of the monopolist and the
entrant ￿rm we obtain second stage pro￿ts:









18Finally, at the ￿rst stage, the monopolist decides ￿, and p which in equilibrium satisfy the condi-
tions:
@￿M(p)
@￿ = (1 ￿ p) > 0;
@￿M(p)
@p = (1 ￿ p) ￿ ￿M(p) = 0:
Observe that the ￿rst of the two partial derivatives above is always larger than zero provided
that the p 2 [0;1). Then, the maximal value of
@￿M(p)
@￿ is reached when p3
M = 0. Consequently,
we substitute p3
M = 0 along the optimal path obtained from
@￿M(p)
@p cp3





18t . This completes the proof.
6.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. At the third and second stages ￿rms set retail prices and locations in the same way as in the
case 2. Then, calculations are the same as in Proposition 3, except that in the ￿rst stage the network
monopolist sets ￿ and p. Second stage pro￿ts are:












Finally, at the ￿rst stage, the monopolist decides ￿, and p which in equilibrium satisfy the condi-
tions:
@￿M(p)
@a = (1 ￿ p) > 0;
@￿M(p)
@p = (1 ￿ p) ￿ ￿M(p) = 0;
and solving in the way of the previous proof, the ￿rst of the two partial derivatives is always larger
than zero provided that p 2 [0;1). Then, the maximal value of
@￿M(p)
@￿ is reached when p4
M = 0.
Consequently, we substitute p4
M = 0 along the optimal path obtained from
@￿M(p)
@p cp4






27t . This completes the proof.
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